Overview

OVERVIEW

On December 30, 1994, BARGE 101 grounded while being pulled by a tug
MERCURY Jack Island, Washington (near Anacortes) from Vancouver, British
Columbia. At the foundation, BARGE 101 was carrying 62,404 barrels
number two diesel oils, and has a draft 16-foot 5-inch front and 19-foot 5-inch
aft.
Platform stabbing four and six numbers right cargo tanks. Damage
Under BARGE 101 found on the right side of the midline,
started in the back of the midships and then continued in an almost straight line to the stern
barges. Plating under angry about four to six inches in the stern area,
with more anger and fractures in the cargo tank number four and six right, near the
hull replacement.
Basis resulted in approximately 26, 936 gallons of spilled diesel oil.

Prevention Bulletin
PROBABLE CAUSE
Office of Marine Safety (OMS) determines that the likely cause of
basis BARGE Master 101 is a failure to accurately trace the pull
MERCURY and BARGE 101 near map navigation hazards. This happens as
results from failure to follow procedures set navigation.
Although not determined with certainty, BARGE 101 likely based on
Clements about Reef (which maps navigation hazards) on the way to the island Jack,
Washington. U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Center (VTC) service sector
MERCURY interesting depicted on the southern edge of traffic lane heading south
Coral area near Clements.
Shortly after passing Reef sector operators to find traction and barges that would
approximately 1 / 2 miles out of the traffic lane, just north of Matia Island. As interesting and
Reef passing barge, the waves subsided, which will have a tendency to
adjust the ship south toward the rock.
Contributing to the cause of this incident are:
? Failure to follow the company pulled Master (Crowley Marine Services, Inc.)
established planning procedures - both trackline and repair plotted on a
chart;
? Master Failure to use navigation tool that has accurately
determine the ship's position and
? Master failure to fairly compensate the effect of tidal currents.
SAFETY ISSUES
Security issues are discussed in this report are:
? Importance follow established procedures and navigation
? Importance of checking the ship's position using a navigation
planning instruments and ship's position on a table.
VESSEL INFORMATION
BARGE 101 was built in 1968 in Portland, Oregon. It is 300 feet long, with broad
Depth of 80 meters and 27.3 meters. 5498 gross tonnage and certified barge
by the U.S. Coast Guard to carry Grade A or below the oil cargo. The interesting
MERCURY was built in 1966 in San Diego, California. It is 105.7 feet long, with
29.7 meters wide and 12 feet deep. MERCURY 195 gross tonnage and
shaft horsepower is 4250.

The BARGE 101
POST ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
The Master, which has been operating towing vessels for more than 16 years in Puget Sound,
said the barge was about 1,000 feet behind and pulled a good puller in quiet
sea assumed an hour in 1915.
At 2109 hours the Master stayed at the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service
(VTS). At this exciting and barges are just north of Patos Island and near
outer edge of the path of southbound traffic. Coast Guard VTS reported that there
no other concept in ship traffic in the area.
Ebb currents on the island of Patos and Matia Island region, with a predicted
maximum ebb Matia Island north occurred at 1901 hours on December 30, 1994. If
not compensated for, tidal currents will manage to tug and barges south and exit
of traffic at Clements reefs. Masters stated that there is 2-3
cut foot (wind waves) in the Coral Clements.
Master explained that he took only navigate using visual and radar bearings and
range. He did not plot the bearings on a chart and do not prepare trackline. The
charts used by the Master (chart number 18421) contains a variety of pencil tracklines
from the previous trip and not the best scale chart for the region.
Master said he graduated in 1 / 4 mile from Clements Reef, but that the estimates
distance may be off as much as 1 / 4 mile. While past Clements Reef area
Master of course makes two changes. Any change of course to 5-7 degrees
port. Of course he said the changes needed to offset ebbing
present. Of course, this change meant to maneuver a pull and tow away from the
Reef.
Coast Guard watchstander VTS sector that followed the south tug
edge of traffic lane to the south like that makes the south. Some time after the pull
Clements passed Reef buoy, diverted attention watchstander sector
elsewhere and he did not observe the pull for a few minutes.
When next observed watchstander interesting and barges, they just north
Matia Island, south of the traffic lane about 1 / 2 miles. At this time,
The first asked the master watchstander speed and then told him that the VTS radar
shows the pull south lanes of traffic. Master replied, "Roger, Out," and
VTS MERCURY watchstander back on track observing southbound traffic.
BARGE 101 damage is not detected until about 2345, near the island of Jack as a
MERCURY tied up BARGE 101. At that time the crew were observed in diesel oil
water around the boat. A spill response efforts by Crowley Marine Services (CMS)
followed.

Prevention Bulletin
Incidents ANALYSIS
? Navigation Procedures
Both shipping and repair plan and watchstanding require tracklines in
periodic intervals in the table. Radar bearings and ranges, visual bearings, then
Global Positioning System (GPS), and echo sounders are all available to help
Master in improving and verifying an interesting position.
During the investigation Master CMS states that do not require planning from
track lines or repair when navigating. However, CMS Manual states, "Vessel
position will remain and are marked on the chart at least every hour (ocean
navigation), every half hour (near shore), or every quarter of an hour (in water). "In
this case, a half-hour minimum necessary corrective procedures under Crowley.
Master of MERCURY not use the GPS receiver is available to verify
interesting position and did not plot any positions on the table.
? Stream
Tidal currents around Sucia and Matia Islands set in the south
direction, but the strength varies between locations. Ebb currents around
from Matia Island was estimated at between 0.5 and 1.5 knots as MERCURY
is the transit area.
Reid's Primer Of Towing1 states, "A close eye is needed on the actual navigation
from attractive than conventional ships. Since the tugboat with a crane would be far more slowly
than the average freighter or tanker, and the effects of drift set in proportion
greater. "
With interesting and barges moving on 8,5-9,0 knots, by the Master account, which
ebbing current of about 1 knot will arrange tow interesting and certainly one
8,5-9 miles for every mile journey. Because the flow from the north, pull
will push to the south and to Clements Reef without
Of course, compensation adjustments.
Master said that he had to change course several times, while in some
Clements Reef to adjust the flow. Because you do not plan for improvements in
chart, he could not know the exact location of the tug and barge relative
to the reef and could not count the set and drift.

The BARGE 101
? Vessel Traffic Service Procedures
Ship, and especially the tank-laden ship, which is known to operate in close navigation
hazards such as this reef, and is determined by the flow towards navigation hazards, possible
deserve special attention or handling by the VTS watchstanders. Previous calls attention
of the VTS may have encouraged the Master to pay more attention to his position.
RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this investigation, the Office of Marine Safety makes the following safety
recommendations
To the owner / operator of tugboats and barges --
? Fleet-wide review navigation procedures. Ensure that this procedure gives
sufficiently about the use of prudent planning for the cruise tracklines,
and improving the appropriate intervals under conditions different (eg, proximity to the herd
water, traffic, tide, visibility, etc.);
? Review the training provided to operators of ships and ensure that the importance of
The following companies submitted clear navigation procedures;
? Navigation fleet review procedures regarding the use of the available navigation
tools. Emphasizing the use of all available navigational equipment and
the importance of cross-checking to prevent errors;
? Require the use of the largest scale charts for the area to be navigated;
? Develop and adopt a system for "quality" check traction's logbooks and charts for
appropriate entries. Practices that actually should be measured against the standard practice for
determine suitability.
For Vessel Traffic Service --
? Push the VTS watchstanders concern to communicate early and direct when
ship can be diverted in danger.
In response to this incident, CMS has been reviewed and strengthened the log-keeping
requirements; review their training, and recommended more emphasis on the cruise
planning and management of bridges; rededicated their programs for the regular crew
performance and qualifications of traveler's checks; and other aspects of this publication relevant
incident to all the officers pulled them.